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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines directors’ remuneration disclosure transparency in an emerging economy 
(Nigeria). We specifically examine how the block share ownership influences the level of transparency 
in the disclosure of directors’ remuneration in a sample of companies listed on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange in 2012. Using ordinary least squares and binary logistic regressions to examine the 
relationship, we find that block share ownership is associated with lower transparent disclosure of 
directors’ remuneration. The result shows a positive relationship between audit quality and 
transparent disclosure of directors’ remuneration. The study finds that the transparency score is less 
than 40%. On the whole, we provide evidence that managers in Nigerian Listed Companies are inclined 
not to make voluntary disclosure of their remuneration to the public. This paper has implication for 
policy makers and regulatory authorities in Nigeria on the need to embark on remuneration 
disclosures reforms so as to make directors’ remuneration disclosure mandatory for Nigerian Listed 
Companies to make it comparable with accepted global good practice. This study contributes to the 
remuneration disclosure transparency literature by providing support for the expropriation 
hypothesis in the behaviour of block shareholders from an emerging economy whose market is very 
much different from those of developed economies. 
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1.0   INTRODUCTION 
 
The last decade of the 20th century witnessed the formal publication of corporate governance codes by 
different countries beginning in the U.K. in 1992 with the Cadbury’s Report. This was the outcome of the 
corporate failures in the U.K. that were attributed to poor corporate governance of those companies in 
addition to controversial pays received by directors (Cadbury Committee, 1992).  The early 2000s 
witnessed high level corporate scandals that cut across many countries that eventually led to the collapse 
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of several of those companies. The glaring findings were that the CEOs and certain other officers of the 
companies were feeding fat on their collapsing companies through their perceived excessive 
remuneration.  There was general discontent that the CEOs have extracted private benefits of excessive 
remuneration from those companies. The general perceptions are that company boards are not doing 
proper monitoring of the executives, the CEO remuneration is on the upside, and is not related to 
company performance (Kaplan, 2012). 
 
It was aftermath of these scandals and crisis that public clamour for increased disclosure of details of 
directors’ remuneration in the annual reports increased especially from the shareholder activists as there 
was increased demand to know how company managers are paid. Council (2014: 31) states 
“remuneration is a key focus for investors.”  As such directors’ remuneration remains one of the most 
discussed topics in the corporate governance literature by academics, press, and among shareholder 
activists that have increased since the recent global financial crisis (Barontini & Bozzi, 2011; Correa & Lel, 
2014; Cremers & Grinstein, 2014; Ferrarini, Moloney, & Vespro, 2003). This in turn has led to different 
legislative and regulatory enactments on directors’ remuneration disclosure by some developed 
economies like the U.S. and the U. K. in order to ensure transparency and accountability. Andjelkovic, 
Boyle, and McNoe (2002) argue that non-disclosure of directors’ remuneration by companies could lead 
to weak association between pay and performance as shareholders will be unable to scrutinize directors’ 
remuneration and exert pressure on the board where they find executive pay to be excessive and not 
performance related. 
 
Extensive literature already exists on directors’ remuneration as to how it is determined even though 
opinions and empirical results are diverse as to whether the CEOs deserve their pay or they are extracting 
private rent from those companies (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Core, Guay, & Larcker, 2003; Core, Guay, & 
Thomas, 2005; Cremers & Grinstein, 2014; Kaplan, 2012; Shin, 2013).  Prior to this time there have been 
different regulatory efforts at ensuring transparent disclosure of directors’ remuneration by the 
companies to the various stakeholders through appropriate disclosure in the annual reports or proxy 
statements.  As efforts are being put into it, it does not seem to be yielding the desired results as the 
CEOs pay continues on the upside.  Recently, regulators’ attention has increased tremendously to the 
extent of disclosure that is required in the annual reports for directors’ remuneration to ensure a higher 
level of transparency. Kaplan (2012) confirms this increased attention, but finds that increased 
regulations on directors’ remuneration such as Dodd-Frank’s Act 2010 in the U.S. did not sway the 
shareholders against CEO pay in 2011 as majority of them supported the executive pay policies adopted 
by their companies.  
 
Nigeria is one of the fastest growing economies in the world with an underdeveloped capital market and 
weak corporate governance mechanism (Okike, 2007; ROSC, 2008, 2011). The apparent weakness in the 
corporate governance system provides a fertile ground for managerial excesses that may not make for 
transparent voluntary disclosure of directors’ remuneration in the annual reports. The country’s first 
corporate governance code was published in 2003 with a revised version in 2011 that recommends the 
disclosure of a company’s remuneration policy and total compensation paid to directors. The code 
suggests that the remuneration of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and executive directors should 
comprise long-term related components such as bonuses and stock options which should be disclosed in 
the annual reports. The extent of compliance with this requirement by Nigerian Listed Companies (NLCs) 
is yet to be empirically investigated. Given that the board of directors may be ineffective in constraining 
the managers from exhibiting self-serving behaviour because of the weakness of the corporate 
governance system, block shareholders may also likely exhibit expropriation behaviour to extract private 
benefits of control. The objective of this paper is to examine the influence of block share ownership on 
the level of transparent disclosure of directors’ remuneration in the annual report and make a case for 
the need for transparent disclosure of detailed directors’ remuneration by NLCs. This study contributes 
to the remuneration disclosure transparency literature by providing support for the expropriation 
hypothesis in the behaviour of block shareholders from an emerging economy whose market is very 
much different from those of developed economies. 
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Using a sample of companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange, consistent with the argument that 
block shareholders align with managerial interests to expropriate minority shareholders we present 
evidence where the proportion of shares held by block shareholders is negatively associated with extent 
of transparent disclosure of directors’ remuneration. The result however indicates that audit quality is 
positively associated with the level of transparency in the disclosure of directors’ remuneration.  We also 
document an insignificant relationship between disclosures of the highest paid director and block share 
ownership. The findings indicate that companies do not provide detailed components of total directors’ 
remuneration in their annual reports. Furthermore, none of the companies in our sample provided 
directors’ remuneration disclosure on an individual basis; some also failed to disclose the amount paid to 
the highest paid director. The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 provides the benefits 
of providing transparent disclosure of directors’ remuneration in the annual reports. Section 3 discusses 
the international perspective on directors’ remuneration disclosure. Directors’ remuneration disclosure 
in Nigeria is presented in section 4 and section 5 presents the review of relevant literature on the 
relationship between transparent disclosure of directors’ remuneration and block share ownership. 
Section 6 provides the data and model specification. The empirical results are contained in section 7 while 
section 8 presents conclusion and recommendations on how Nigeria can ensure transparency in 
disclosure of directors’ remuneration by the listed companies. 
 
2.0   BENEFITS OF TRANSPARENT DISCLOSURE OF DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION  
 
Excessive directors’ remuneration has gradually become one of the major agency problems that was 
hardly envisaged by the agency theorists as it was regarded as a means of mitigating the agency conflicts 
(Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Ferrarini et al., 2003; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). The professional managers run 
large complex companies because of the diffused nature of its share ownership. From the agency theory 
perspective, this separation of ownership and control results in information asymmetry between the 
managers and shareholders that can only be bridged through appropriate disclosure of information 
(Healy & Palepu, 2001). Information disclosure is therefore seen as a means of reducing the agency 
conflicts through reduction in information asymmetry between the shareholders (principals) and 
managers (agents).  In support of this argument, Muslu (2010) suggests that voluntary disclosure of 
directors’ remuneration would constrain the executives from exhibiting opportunistic behaviour.    
 
As contentious as directors’ remuneration issue is several companies view it as confidential matter that 
should not get to the public domain (Ehikioya, 2009). For example, in the U.S. company executives 
endeavour to understate the option grants component of their total remuneration (Yermack, 1998).  It 
is this lack of transparency that has made regulatory authorities to demand mandatory disclosure of 
directors’ remuneration by listed companies. It is deemed appropriate to let shareholders know what the 
executives take home as rewards for their efforts at enhancing the worth of the company that invariably 
translates to enhanced shareholders wealth. Numerous benefits will accrue to all stakeholders when 
there is transparent disclosure of directors’ remuneration by companies. Ferrarini et al. (2003) identified 
the attendant benefits of disclosure of directors’ remuneration to include the following; resolution of the 
procedural and structural problems associated with directors’ remuneration, it will enable shareholders 
to evaluate whether the directors have acted in protecting their interest or otherwise, institutional 
shareholders will be incentivized to do more executive monitoring as this disclosure enhances their 
reputation, directors’ remuneration that is transparently disclosed will save the board from undue 
pressure and bolsters their reputation. 
 
In addition, a company that makes transparent disclosure of directors’ remuneration will be able to 
concentrate on the business of managing the company and attracts the confidence of investors on the 
board and the management. When there is a national regulatory policy document on directors’ 
remuneration, it sends a strong signal to the international business community that the country is ready 
for serious business. This may in turn make foreign investors to beam their investment searchlight on the 
country.  The shareholders feel a sense of fulfilment that they have made wise investment decisions as 
they become convinced that executives actually deserve their pay.  Kaplan (2012) provides empirical 
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support for this when he documents that shareholders gave approval for their companies’ directors’ 
remuneration policies in 2011. 
3.0  INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION DISCLOSURE 
 
The contention on directors’ remuneration disclosure is to show whether the directors truly deserve their 
pay or otherwise in the light of discoveries that the companies over which they presided were almost 
insolvent. Accordingly, twelve countries have now enacted laws that require shareholders to have a say 
on directors’ remuneration issues (Correa & Lel, 2014).  The principal drivers of this law are the U.S. and 
the U.K. who both have strong investor protection rights and enforcement and compliance mechanism 
in operation.  The demand for transparent disclosure of directors’ remuneration is not recent as the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has been responsible for ensuring transparent disclosure of 
directors’ remuneration in the annual proxy statements by listed companies in the U.S. by promulgating 
rules that are mandatory for them to comply with since 1938 (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
2006). 
 
After much agitation from the U.S. Congress and shareholder activists, the SEC in 1992 published a new 
disclosure rule on directors’ remuneration requiring all companies listed on a national stock exchange to 
make appropriate disclosure of directors’ remuneration in its annual proxy statements (Vafeas & 
Afxentiou, 1998), (see Straka (1993) for a comprehensive review of the 1992 Disclosure of Executive 
Compensation under SEC in the U.S.). Straka (1993) states increasing use of long-term incentives plan, 
shareholder activism and negative perception of executive compensation by the public as factors that 
led to the amendment on directors’ remuneration disclosure rules in 1992 by SEC. Vafeas & Afxentiou 
(1998) in their assessment of the impact of the new rules on directors’ remuneration disclosure conclude 
that it has stirred the compensation committee to action just as executive compensation became related 
to company performance compared to the pre-rule period.  In spite of what seems to be accomplished 
goal from the academic front of the new rules stakeholders continued to demand more transparency in 
directors’ remuneration matters as the CEO pay continued on the upward trend. 
 
In 2006 the SEC adopted an amendment to the directors’ remuneration disclosure rules by making 
additional disclosure requirements. By 2010 the Dodd-Frank Act 2010 was enacted that demands 
shareholders should have a say on the pay received by the executives. Correa & Lel (2014) examine the 
effect of say on pay laws on executive compensation in 39 countries and conclude that it has helped in 
reducing excessive CEO compensation, and has led to increased pay-performance sensitivity. As at the 
time of writing this paper, the 2015 suggested amendment is under consideration in the U.S. This is the 
extent that the U.S. has taken the issue of directors’ remuneration disclosure for the benefit of the 
shareholders and concerned public in pursuit of transparency and accountability. In spite of all the 
positive effects attributed to the rules as amended the journey to amendments has not yet ended as it 
still continues. 
 
The 2006 disclosure rules require listed companies to make the following disclosures in their proxy 
statements: options disclosure, compensation discussion and analysis, and compensation tables. The 
contents of the summary compensation table are name and principal position, year, salary, bonus, stock 
awards, option awards, non-equity incentive plan compensation, change in pension value and 
nonqualified deferred compensation earnings, all other compensation, and total remuneration. This 
information is to be provided for the last three completed fiscal years for the following people: all 
directors, Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), and three other most highly paid 
officers of the company.  In addition, the company is also required to provide Compensation Discussion 
and Analysis to make investors have deep insight into the executive compensation policies of the 
company. 
 
In the U.K., Cadbury’s Report 1992 recommends the disclosure of the total emoluments of the directors, 
chairman, and the highest paid director in the annual report. The components of the total emoluments 
such as salary, bonuses, stock options, and pension contributions are to be disclosed and explanations 
provided on the modality for measuring performance. Greenbury’s Report 1995 was a major attempt in 
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the U.K. to make demand for detailed disclosure of directors’ remuneration in the annual reports to 
ensure transparency and accountability so as assuage the complaints from the public and shareholders 
regarding the excessive remuneration received by company managers that are perceived not to be 
performance related. It specifically required the detailed disclosure of the components of the individual 
director’s remuneration such as basic salary, annual bonuses, benefits in kind, long term incentive 
schemes such as share options and description of pensions. Efforts have not ceased as another 
remuneration disclosure requirement was enacted by the Parliament in 2013.  The directors’ 
remuneration report must contain the remuneration details for each director during the financial year 
that includes the total amount of salaries and fees, all taxable benefits, performance related bonuses, 
pensions related benefits and total of all components of compensation. This is required to be presented 
in a tabular form. The U.K. has integrated its directors’ remuneration disclosure requirements into the 
Companies Act and the Listing Requirements of the London Stock Exchange. Furthermore, the U.K. 
requires companies to publish Directors’ Remuneration Report for every financial year of the company 
just like the audited annual reports and must be sent to every shareholder of the company 21 days before 
the Annual General Meeting (AGM).   
 
4.0  DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION DISCLOSURE IN NIGERIA 
 
The Nigeria corporate environment is characterised by low investor protection rights, weak compliance 
and enforcement mechanisms that have rendered the corporate governance system ineffective (Okike, 
2007; ROSC, 2008, 2011).  In an attempt to formally structure the corporate governance practice in NLCs 
in the light of happenings in the global business community the Corporate Governance Code for Public 
Companies in Nigeria (CG Code) 2003 was published that specifically recommended the disclosure of the 
directors’ emoluments together with that of the chairman and the highest paid director in the annual 
report. It is however disappointing that no explanation was required for non compliance and the 
companies were not required to provide their remuneration policies to the shareholders. The CG Code 
2003 left the duty of reporting non compliant companies to the press. The Nigerian press is not yet very 
much active in reporting directors’ remuneration disclosure matters like their U.S. counterpart. Core, 
Guay, and Larcker (2008) provides evidence regarding this when they examined more than 11,000 press 
articles between 1994 and 2002 that discussed CEO compensation in the U.S. to ascertain their influence 
on executive compensation. This cannot be said about Nigeria, and explains the level of awareness the 
press has brought to the public as regards directors’ remuneration issues among NLCs.  Prior to the 
publication of CG Code 2003 NLCs were not willing to make such disclosure as it was considered 
confidential information (Ehikioya, 2009).  It is from this perspective that Adegbite (2012) argued for a 
legal corporate governance regulatory framework in Nigeria in the short run given the corporate 
corruption that is deep in the country’s corporate governance system.   
 
5.0 BLOCK SHAREHOLDERS AND TRANSPARENT DISCLOSURE OF DIRECTORS’ 
REMUNERATION   
 
Agency theorists argue that the separation of ownership from management will inevitably create agency 
conflicts between the shareholders and the managers especially when the shareholders are widely 
dispersed (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The alignment and expropriation hypotheses 
are the two competing hypotheses as to the role of the block shareholders in companies.  According to 
the alignment hypothesis Becker, Cronqvist, and Fahlenbrach (2011), share ownership concentration 
allows the block shareholders to do proper monitoring of the managers at ensuring that they work for 
the enhancement of overall shareholders wealth. Their presence in companies therefore is anticipated 
will constrain the managers from opportunistic behaviour in form of excessive remuneration and lower 
disclosure of information in the annual report. Therefore, the conjecture of this hypothesis is a positive 
relationship between transparent disclosure of directors’ remuneration and block share ownership. In 
contrast, the expropriation hypothesis (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Renders & 
Gaeremynck, 2012; Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008) argue that the presence of block 
shareholders would create what is addressed as the principal-principal agency problem where the block 
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shareholders would be more prone to extract private benefits of control.  Under this hypothesis, block 
shareholders will use their control rights and influence to their private advantage. This hypothesis 
predicts a negative relationship between transparent disclosure of information on directors’ 
remuneration and block share ownership.  This is because they have access to the management and their 
information needs. To support this hypothesis Guthrie and Sokolowsky (2010) examine how block 
shareholders will behave when they have the opportunity of extracting private benefits of control.  They 
provide empirical evidence that in the presence of block shareholders earnings are managed upward 
around seasoned equity offerings. 
 
Previous studies that have investigated the effectiveness of block shareholders at ensuring transparent 
disclosure of information by companies have reported incongruous results (Barako, Hancock, & Izan, 
2006; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Samaha, Dahawy, Hussainey, & Stapleton, 2012). Samaha et al. (2012) 
examine the extent of corporate governance disclosure and the influence of corporate governance 
attributes with a sample of 100 companies listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange. Using both the 
ordinary least squares and the binary logistic regressions their result support the expropriation 
hypothesis as they find a statistically significant negative relationship between block shareholders and 
voluntary disclosure. Their result is similar to that of Barako et al., (2006) that examine the factors that 
influence voluntary disclosure in Kenyan listed companies. Their sample consists of 43 companies 
covering the period 1992 to 2001.  With the aid of pooled regression analysis they provide evidence of a 
negative relationship between block shareholders and voluntary disclosure.  On the other hand Haniffa 
& Cooke (2002) with evidence from Malaysia report a positive relationship between the variables 
indicating that the block shareholders improve the level of disclosure of information by companies.  This 
finding is consistent with the alignment hypothesis. 
 
The few identified studies that have examined the transparency of directors’ remuneration (Ben-Amar & 
Zeghal, 2011; Coulton, James, & Taylor, 2001; Muslu, 2010) did not consider block share ownership as an 
explanatory variable. Samaha et al. (2012: 171) argue that “... investors with large equity shares in a 
company can obtain information about the company from internal sources. Therefore, more closely held 
companies are more likely to disclose less information.”  On the principal-principal problem, Hope (2013) 
argues that there exists agency conflict between block shareholders and minority shareholders in 
countries with low legal protection for minority shareholders. He argues further that the block 
shareholders may be more likely to extract private benefits of control to the detriment of the minority 
shareholders. Their extraction of private benefits of control is more likely to make them to become 
pressure sensitive and as such may not be inclined to demand transparent disclosure of directors’ 
remuneration.    
 
Consistent with the expropriation hypothesis since legal protection for investors is low in Nigeria, we 
therefore hypothesize that block share ownership in companies will result in lower transparent 
disclosure of directors’ remuneration in Nigerian listed companies. 
 
6.0  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
6.01 SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
The initial sample for this study consists of 108 companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange whose 
annual reports for 2012 could be accessed.  The companies in the financial and insurance sectors were 
excluded from the sample size because of their adherence to additional codes and legislations.  
Additional companies whose shareholders information could not be accessed were further removed 
from the sample. After eliminating companies with missing information this study had 45 companies for 
the OLS regression and 59 companies for the binary logistic regression. The period 2012 was chosen as 
appropriate for the study because it is the first year after the publication of the CG Code 2011. 
 
6.02 DEVELOPING TRANSPARENCY DISCLOSURE INDEX  
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The dependent variable is the directors’ remuneration transparency disclosure score (TRASC). The study 
developed the transparency disclosure index from the recommendations of the Code of Corporate 
Governance for Public Companies in Nigeria (CG Code) 2003 and 2011 as regards directors’ remuneration 
issues. Content analysis was used for extracting the necessary information on directors’ remuneration 
matters from the annual reports. Since the required information is not contained in a particular section 
of the annual report, considerable effort was put to reading each annual report in order to obtain needed 
information. In all 10 indicators that relate to directors’ remuneration matters were identified and they 
were all equally weighted as assigning weights to any would make for loss of objectivity. Both weighted 
and unweighted methods have been reported to produce similar results (Barako et al., 2006).  In 
remuneration transparency disclosure studies researchers have used different disclosure indexes (Ben-
Amar & Zeghal, 2011; Coulton, James, & Taylor, 2001; Muslu, 2010) depending on the study’s legal and 
regulatory environment. 
 
6.03 INDEPENDENT VARIABLE  
 
The objective of this study is to examine how block share ownership (BLKOWN) influences the 
transparency of information disclosure on directors’ remuneration maters in NLCs in the annual report.  
The independent variable is the block share ownership and this is measured as the percentage 
shareholding by shareholders who hold a minimum of 5% of company shares.  This is consistent with 
measures used in past research (Eng & Mak, 2003; Guthrie & Sokolowsky, 2010; Samaha et al., 2012). 
 
6.04 CONTROL VARIABLES  
 
The remuneration disclosure literature shows association with different company characteristics and 
other variables. In this study we control for audit quality (AUDT4), company performance (ROA), 
company size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), and sales growth (GRT) as they have been included in the regression 
equation in previous studies (Adelopo, 2011; Akhtaruddin & Haron, 2010; Ben-Amar & Zeghal, 2011; Gul & 
Leung, 2004; Samaha et al., 2012). The relationship between voluntary disclosure and multinational 
auditors (Big Auditors) has remained mixed from past research (Adelopo, 2011; Barako et al., 2006; Gul & 
Leung, 2004).  When any of the big audit firms serve as a company’s external auditor, it is an indication 
of high audit quality (Gul & Leung, 2004) and is therefore expected to be associated with increased 
transparent disclosure of information by companies in their annual report. Adelopo (2011) documents a 
positive relationship between audit quality and voluntary disclosure while (Barako et al., 2006; Gul & 
Leung, 2004) document an insignificant relationship. Consistent with prior studies we measure audit 
quality with the Big 4 audit firms (Adelopo, 2011).  A company that is audited by any of the Big 4 is assigned 
a value of 1, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Past research on voluntary disclosure studies has shown that company performance is a determinant of 
voluntary disclosure (Adelopo, 2011; Babío Arcay & Muiño Vázquez, 2005; Ben-Amar & Zeghal, 2011).  High 
performing companies are expected to have the inclination to make increased transparent disclosure of 
information as signal to the market. However, Ben-Amar & Zeghal (2011) provide empirical evidence of 
an insignificant relationship between disclosure transparency and company performance. In contrast, 
Adelopo (2011) document a significant negative relationship between voluntary disclosure and company 
performance measured as return on assets (ROA). Following Adelopo (2011) this study measures 
company performance as the company’s ROA.  We also control for company size as previous studies have 
argued that large companies have the resources to make higher disclosures than their smaller 
counterparts (Babío Arcay & Muiño Vázquez, 2005; Hossain & Hammami, 2009). Company size is 
measured as the company’s total assets similar to that used by Babío Arcay & Muiño Vázquez (2005). 
Muslu (2010) and Ben-Amar & Zeghal (2011) report a significant positive relationship between company 
size and extent of disclosure made by companies. 
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Next, we control for leverage even though past research has produced inconsistent findings (Ben-Amar 
& Zeghal, 2011; Samaha et al., 2012). Restrictive debt covenants serve as constraint on managers and 
creditors may not necessarily demand increased disclosure of information by companies (Eng & Mak, 
2003).  The implication is that highly levered companies may likely provide less transparent disclosure in 
the annual report. While Ben-Amar & Zeghal (2011) report a negative relationship between disclosure and 
leverage, Samaha et al. (2012) document an insignificant relationship between the variables.  Following 
(Ben-Amar & Zeghal, 2011; Eng & Mak, 2003), leverage is measured as total liabilities deflated by total 
assets. Finally, we consider growth as another control variable that has been controlled for in prior 
research. Eng & Mak (2003) argue that growth companies are more likely to make increased disclosure 
of information than their non-growth counterparts. We measure growth as sales growth over that of the 
previous year similar to Colpan and Yoshikawa (2012). 
 
6.05 MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 
Our study employs both the ordinary least squares (OLS) and the binary logistic regression to examine 
the association between block share ownership and disclosure transparency score and disclosure of the 
highest paid director respectively. Model 1 is for the OLS regression while Model 2 is for the binary logistic 
regression. The binary logistic regression is used for Model 2 because the highest paid director is a 
dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if a company discloses its highest paid directors and 0 if 
not disclosed.  
 
DTRASC = βo + β1BLKOWN + β2AUDT4 + β3ROA+ β4SIZE+ β5LEV 
+ β6GRT + Ɛ 
... 1 
    
HPD = βo + β1BLKOWN + β2AUDT4 + β3ROA+ β4SIZE+ β5LEV 
+ β6GRT + Ɛ 
... 2 
Where:    
DTRASC = Disclosure transparency score  
HPD = Highest paid director  
BLKOWN = Block share ownership  
AUDT4 = Big 4 audit firms  
ROA = Return on assets  
SIZE = Total assets  
LEV = Total liabilities divided by total assets  
GRT = Sales growth  
Ɛ = Random error term  
  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics on level of transparency of disclosure of directors’ remuneration (N = 48) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Transparency Score 3.729 1.440 1 5 
Compensation Policy 0 0 0 0 
Material Benefits 0.021 0.144 0 1 
Total Directors’ Remuneration 0.875 0.334 0 1 
Remuneration Committee 0.542 0.504 0 1 
Non-Executive Directors’ Fees 0.771 0.425 0 1 
Executive Directors’ Remuneration 0.688 0.468 0 1 
Long-Term Incentive Plans 0 0 0 0 
Share Options 0 0 0 0 
Highest Paid Director 0.833 0.377 0 1 
Individual Director’s Remuneration 0 0 0 0 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics on the study variables (N = 45) 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
TRASC 0.389 0.400 0.134 0.100 0.500 
BLKOWN 0.556 0.600 0.233 0.105 0.949 
AUDT4 0.778 1 0.420 0 1 
ROA 0.088 0.087 0.185 -0.927 0.302 
SIZE (N’000) 7.44e+07 2.80e+07 1.29e+08 672492 6.74e+08 
LEV 0 .609 0.562 0.225 0.265 1.504 
GRT 0.071 0.050 0.180 -0.493 0.595 
 
7.0  RESULTS  
 
7.01 SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
The descriptive statistics on level of transparency of disclosure of directors’ remuneration is presented 
in Table 1. The Table shows that out of the maximum 10 points available from the indicators, the maximum 
score obtained by sample companies was 5 with a minimum of 1. On the average the transparency score 
stood at 37.29%. This is low compared to the 68% reported by Muslu (2010) for large European companies 
and 54.44% documented for Australian companies by Coulton et al. (2001).  2.10% of the companies 
disclosed information on material benefits received by company directors while 87.50% disclosed 
directors’ total remuneration in the annual report. Companies with remuneration committees constitute 
54.20% of the sample. 83.30% of the companies disclosed the highest paid director. The average disclosure 
for non-executive directors’ fees was 77.10%   and 68.80% for executive directors’ remuneration. The 
result also indicates that none of the companies made any disclosure as regards compensation policy, 
long-term incentive plans, share options, and individual directors’ remuneration. This result however is 
an improvement over the survey report conducted by the World Bank/IFC on Corporate Governance 
ROSC assessment of Nigeria in 2008 (see ROSC, 2008). 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the study variables. The disclosure transparency score is 
38.90% on average. The mean block share ownership is 55.60% from a minimum of 10.50% to a maximum 
of 94.90%. This implies that there is high share ownership concentration in Nigeria, and is consistent with 
the finding of Sanda, Garba, and Mikailu (2011).   The Table shows that 77.80% of the companies are 
audited by any of the Big 4 audit firms while the Return on Assets stood at 8.80% on average. The average 
company is worth N7.44 Billion.  On average, the leverage ratio is 0.609 and the mean sales growth is 
7.10%. 
 
Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
Variables TRASC BLKOWN AUDT4 ROA SIZE LEV GRT 
TRASC 1.0000       
BLKOWN -0.1753 
(0.2493) 
1.0000      
AUDT4 0.3599** 
(0.0152) 
0.1111 
(0.4676) 
1.0000     
ROA 0.0708 
(0.6438) 
0.0186 
(0.9033) 
0.0038 
(0.9800) 
1.0000    
SIZE 0.2694* 
(0.0736) 
0.1019 
(0.5054) 
0.2465 
(0.1026) 
0.1647 
(0.2797) 
1.0000   
LEV 0.0906 
(0.5538) 
0.0062 
(0.9676) 
-0.0278 
(0.8562) 
-0.4157*** 
(0.0045) 
-0.0348 
(0.8205) 
1.0000  
GRT -0.0687 
(0.6538) 
-0.1258 
(0.4104) 
0.0818 
(0.5931) 
0.5230*** 
(0.0002) 
0.2466 
(0.1025) 
-0.2515* 
(0.0957 
1.0000 
*** at 1% level; ** at 5% level.  The p-values are in parentheses  
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Table 4: OLS regression result of transparency of directors’ remuneration disclosure on block share 
ownership and control variables 
 Coef. t-Stat p-value 
Intercept 0.321*** 3.930 0.000 
BLKOWN -0.161* -2.010 0.052 
AUDT4 0.113** 2.520 0.016 
ROA 0.174 1.400 0.169 
SIZE 2.54e-10 1.680 0.101 
LEV 0.083 0.930 0.359 
GRT -0.211 -1.710 0.095 
N 45   
F-stat 2.63**   
Adjusted R2 18.15%   
*** at 1% level; ** at 5% level; * at 10% level.  The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 5: Binary logistic regression of disclosure of highest paid director on block share ownership and 
control variables 
 Coef. z-Stat p-value 
Intercept 0.931 0.460 0.645 
BLKOWN 0.414 0.210 0.834 
AUDT4 1.531 1.490 0.135 
ROA -4.742 -1.300 0.193 
SIZE -5.54e-10    -0.120 0.908 
LEV 0.675 0.250 0.804 
GRT 3.116 0.920 0.358 
N 59   
Log likelihood   -17.102   
 
 
7.02 CORRELATION ANALYSIS  
 
The correlation matrix presented in Table 3 shows the correlation analysis for all the variables employed 
in the study. The result indicates no significant correlation between transparent disclosure of directors’ 
remuneration and block share ownership. This result is not consistent with the study’s hypothesis. It 
however shows that large companies and those audited by any of the Big 4 audit firms are more likely to 
make transparent disclosure of their directors’ remuneration in the annual report. The highest correlation 
coefficient is 0.5320 between ROA and GRT. We further investigate for the existence of multicollinearity 
among the independent and control variables using the variance inflation factor (VIF) and find that the 
highest VIF is 1.59 suggesting that multicollinearity is not an issue in the study. 
 
7.03 REGRESSION RESULTS   
 
For Model 1, the dependent variable is the transparency score that has values between 0 and 1.  Table 4 
shows the OLS regression on transparency score and block share ownership and the control variables.  
The adjusted R2 is 18.15% indicating that the model explains 18.15% of the variations in transparent 
disclosure of directors’ remuneration in NLCs.  For the block share ownership variable, we find that the 
coefficient estimate on BLKOWN is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level (β = -0.161, p = 
0.052). The implication of this negative coefficient is that block share holders constrain increased 
disclosure of directors’ remuneration. This result supports the study’s hypothesis that block share 
ownership in companies will result in lower transparent disclosure of directors’ remuneration in NLCs, a 
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confirmation of the expropriation hypothesis. This finding is consistent with Adelopo (2011) for NLCs on 
extent of corporate governance disclosure and also with that of Samaha et al. (2012) from Egypt but 
differs from the finding of Haniffa and Cooke (2002) from Malaysia that document a positive association. 
This is consistent with the argument that block shareholders have the tendency to expropriate the 
minority shareholders and align their interest with those of the management.  Another explanation could 
be that since they have access to needed information about directors’ remuneration they are more likely 
to become indifferent to its disclosure in the annual report.      
 
Further, we document that companies that are audited by the Big 4 audit firms show positive association 
with level of transparency of disclosure of directors’ remuneration at 5% level (β = 0.113, p = 0.016).  This 
finding is similar to that documented by Adelopo (2011) but contrasts the result of Eng and Mak (2003) 
that report an insignificant relationship. There is a significant negative relationship between transparent 
disclosure of directors’ remuneration and growth at 10% level (β = -0.211, p = 0.095). This result contrasts 
the finding of Eng and Mak (2003) that there is no significant relationship between disclosure and a 
company’s growth. For the other control variables, we find that company performance, size, and 
leverage do not have any significant relationship with the level of transparency in the disclosure of 
directors’ remuneration. 
 
7.04 FURTHER ANALYSIS  
 
For Model 2, the binary logistic regression for the disclosure of the highest paid director is presented in 
Table 5 to examine the robustness of our result. The disclosure of the highest paid director is used as the 
dependent variable. The significant negative relationship between transparency score and block share 
ownership is not supported for the disclosure of the highest paid director and block share ownership. 
The audit quality (Big 4) that shows positive association with transparency disclosure returns insignificant 
result for disclosure of the highest paid director. All other control variables also do not show any 
significant relationship with the disclosure of the highest paid director. Further, in the OLS regression we 
entered ROE in place of ROA and the result remains qualitatively similar with the first regression result. 
 
8.0  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS   
 
This paper has examined the relationship between directors’ remuneration disclosure transparency and 
block share ownership in Nigeria. The regulatory disclosure requirements on directors’ remuneration 
from international perspective were first discussed before situating the Nigeria context.  It does appear 
that the developed economies are always from time to time reviewing their directors’ remuneration 
disclosure requirements to adequately protect the shareholders from CEOs rent extraction tendencies, 
encourage transparency and so reduce information asymmetry between shareholders and managers.  
The implication is that the effort at ensuring transparency in directors’ remuneration disclosure remains 
a continuous process.  This however cannot be said about Nigeria whose only legislative effort remains 
the disclosure requirement in the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 1990 that is long overdue 
for amendment to make it compliant with what obtains in the present global corporate environment.  
The CG Code 2011 requirement is not strong enough and the directors’ remuneration disclosure 
requirement is at an abysmally low level when benchmarked against international standards, besides 
there is no penalty for non-compliance as there is no clause for ‘comply or explain’ in the CG Code 2011 as 
such none of the companies provide explanations for their noncompliance with the remuneration 
disclosure requirement of the CG Codes. The disclosure requirement is structurally defective as it seems 
to shield the executives’ remuneration from public scrutiny.   
 
Empirically, this study finds that block share ownership is associated with lower transparency in the 
disclosure of directors’ remuneration. This supports the expropriation hypothesis while the multinational 
audit firms seem to encourage transparent disclosure of directors’ remuneration. We also document that 
the directors’ remuneration disclosure transparency level is low compared to those of some other 
countries. While it is obvious that Nigeria may not be able to match the developed economies directors’ 
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remuneration disclosure requirements considering the cost implications it is important that the 
shareholders know the components of what the directors and executives receive as total pay for their 
services to the company.  Drawing from the discussions above, the question is what path should Nigeria 
take? We make the following suggestions to ensure transparent disclosure of directors’ remuneration by 
NLCs since the directors are not willing to make voluntary disclosure to reduce information asymmetry 
between the shareholders and the managers. The National Assembly committee on Capital Markets 
should initiate a process that will lead to the amendment of CAMA 1990 that will make directors’ 
remuneration disclosure a core issue among other issues. This is expected to make the Act be up to date 
with present day reality. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Nigeria should make directors’ 
remuneration disclosure a top priority so as not to be seen as protecting the over bearing executives. 
The remuneration should be detailed on individual basis and the components identified like that of the 
U.K.  It will be appropriate for SEC Nigeria to provide a code for directors’ remuneration disclosure that 
will be mandatory for listed companies to comply with. 
 
It is also expected that the Nigerian Stock Exchange should include the both legal and regulatory 
requirements on directors’ remuneration disclosure into its listing rules and make it mandatory for 
companies. From the ethical view, there is the need for collaboration between the Institute of Directors 
Nigeria and the Society for Corporate Governance Nigeria on how to make the boards of directors 
effective in their oversight duties so as to make their companies comply with the directors’ remuneration 
disclosure requirements that will be truly transparent.  While it could be argued that the regulators are 
not doing enough regarding disclosure of directors’ remuneration by companies in Nigeria, it should 
however be noted that voluntary disclosure of information is part of evidence of transparency by 
companies. 
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